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Domestic Relations
by Barry B. McGough*
and Gregory R. Miller**
This survey period 1 saw continued changes to domestic relations law
in Georgia. The Georgia General Assembly completed its sweeping
revisions of the child support guidelines. The electorate passed an
amendment to the Georgia Constitution defining "marriage." The
Georgia Supreme Court extended its 2003 pilot project for the third year,
agreeing to accept all "non-frivolous" applications filed in divorce and
alimony cases during the 2006 calendar year.2 As a result, all persons
interested in domestic relations law have benefited from many more
substantive decisions from the appellate courts.
I.

DIVORCE: PROCEDURE

While a trial court is not authorized to grant a default judgment in a
divorce case, the trial court is vested with wide latitude to oversee its
docket and enforce its orders. In Bayless v. Bayless,' the husband failed
to appear at a rule nisi hearing he had requested and failed to comply
with two separate discovery orders. The husband also failed to
personally appear at a mediation session as ordered by the trial court.
When the husband failed to appear at the final trial, the trial court

* Partner in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of California at Berkeley (A.B., 1963); University of California (LL.B., 1966). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of McGough, Huddleston & Medori, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., 1989); Georgia State University (J.D., 1994). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
1. This survey chronicles developments in Georgia domestic relations law from June
1, 2005 to May 31, 2006.
2. The pilot project does not apply to all domestic relations cases, only to those arising
out of divorce or alimony. For instance, the pilot project does not encompass appeals of
contempt cases, interlocutory appeals, or writs of certiorari. Furthermore, the pilot project
does not cover cases appealable to the court of appeals.
3. 280 Ga. 153, 625 S.E.2d 741 (2006).
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rejected the motion for continuance made by his counsel and dismissed
the husband's counterclaim. The trial court allowed the husband's
counsel to make arguments and cross-examine the wife's witnesses;
however, the husband's counsel was not permitted to offer witnesses on
the husband's behalf.4 The supreme court acknowledged that Uniform
Superior Court Rule 10.4 5 neither requires a party to appear at trial nor
authorizes the trial court to punish a party who does not appear.6
Nevertheless, the supreme court noted that the trial court does have
statutory authority to "compel obedience to its orders and to control the
conduct of everyone connected with a judicial proceeding before that
court."7
Looking at the husband's conduct as a whole rather than the
husband's single act of failing to appear for trial, the supreme court held
that the trial court was within its discretion to strike the husband's
answer and counterclaim.8 As a result, the trial court acted properly in
barring the husband's presentation of witnesses while allowing the
husband's attorney to participate in all other aspects of the trial.9
II.

ALIMONY

The supreme court addressed a variety of issues involving the
payment of alimony. In Benton v. Benton,'0 the court addressed
whether a party was estopped from requesting alimony." During the
litigation, the wife filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. When the
wife filed her bankruptcy action, she included a "Statement of Financial
Affairs," which included the divorce action as litigation to which she was
a party." On another required document, the wife was asked if there
to
was any "[allimony, maintenance, support, and property settlements
14
which [she] is or may be entitled."'" The wife responded, "None."
After the wife's debts were discharged, the husband filed a motion for
partial summary judgment based on the application of the doctrine of
federal judicial estoppel. This doctrine is most commonly used to bar
debtors from pursuing claims that were not disclosed during the

4.

Id. at 153-54; 625 S.E.2d at 741-42.

5.

GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 10.4.

6.
7.
8.

Bayless, 280 Ga. at 155, 625 S.E.2d at 742-43.
Id., 625 S.E.2d at 743 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 15-1-3(3), (4) (2005)).
Id. at 155-56, 625 S.E.2d at 742-43.

9. Id.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

280 Ga. 468, 629 S.E.2d 204 (2006).
Id. at 468, 629 S.E.2d at 206.
Id.
Id. (brackets in original).
Id.
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bankruptcy. The husband argued that because the wife failed to disclose
to the bankruptcy court that she was seeking alimony and property
division in the divorce action, she should be barred from doing so after
the bankruptcy discharge. 5
In response to the husband's motion for partial summary judgment,
the wife filed a motion to reopen the bankruptcy action to allow her to
amend the bankruptcy schedule in dispute. The bankruptcy court
granted the motion, and the wife amended her bankruptcy documents. 6
Generally, judicial estoppel is inapplicable when a plaintiff has
successfully amended his or her bankruptcy petition to include any
claim against the defendant as a potential asset because then it cannot
be said that the position in the trial court is inconsistent with the
position asserted by the plaintiff in the bankruptcy proceeding ......
The supreme court, however, held that additional factors existed that
supported the trial court's refusal to apply federal judicial estoppel."5
First, the wife did disclose the existence of the pending divorce action in
her petition. 9 Second, there was no evidence that the wife derived any
actual benefit from the alleged nondisclosure. ° Finally, the application
of federal judicial estoppel to divorce cases should be met with hesitation.2 The court reasoned that a spouse's right to financial support
22
and a division of the marital estate should not be discarded lightly.
23 the supreme court addressed the propriety of
In Farrishv. Farrish,

the amount of a spousal support award. 4 Unlike awards of child
support, 25 the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") provides
no guidelines regulating the amount of alimony awards.2 6 In Farrish
the court ordered the husband to pay the wife $2000 per month as

15. Id.
16. Id. at 469, 629 S.E.2d at 206.
17. Id. at 470, 629 S.E.2d at 207.
18. Id. at 471, 629 S.E.2d at 208.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 471-72, 629 S.E.2d at 208 (citing Southworth v. Southworth, 265 Ga. 671,
675, 461 S.E.2d 215, 219 (1995) (Fletcher, P.J., concurring specially); Brady v. Brady, 228
Ga. 617, 618, 187 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1972); Dial v. Adkins, 265 Ga. App. 650, 651, 595 S.E.2d
332, 334 (2004); Suarez v. Halbert, 246 Ga. App. 822, 825, 543 S.E.2d 733, 736 (2000)).
23. 279 Ga. 551, 615 S.E.2d 510 (2005).
24. Id. at 551, 615 S.E.2d at 510-11.
25. See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (Supp. 2006) (providing guidelines governing awards of child
support).
26. See Worrell v. Worrell, 242 Ga. 44, 45, 247 S.E.2d 847, 849 (1978).
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alimony and $3000 per month as child support for the parties' five
children." The husband's gross income was $10,374 per month.
While Georgia does not have statutory "alimony guidelines," Georgia
law does provide a list of factors that may be considered by the trier of
fact in determining whether to award alimony and how much to
award.28
In this case, the trial court properly considered "[t]he
condition of the parties, including the ... earning capacity ... of the
parties."29 The court noted that the wife was unemployed and would
need training to obtain any job that paid more than minimum wage. 0
The court determined that the trial court was also within its discretion
to consider the husband's resources beyond his income."' For example,
during the parties' separation, the husband took $55,000 in marital
assets without accounting for the appropriated assets. 2 The trial court
was also autho rized to consider the husband's conduct during the
marriage, including his amassing debt and paying the expenses of his
paramour and her family.3 Consequently, the supreme court concluded that there was no abuse of the wide discretion vested in the trial
court to determine the amount of alimony.3 4
The supreme court decided two cases concerning the award of alimony
from one spouse's separate property. In Smelser u. Smelser,35 the trial
court determined that the marital home was the husband's separate
property; however, the trial court awarded as alimony to the wife
exclusive use of the home until she remarried or until the youngest child
reached age twenty. The trial court further ordered the husband to pay
the mortgage, taxes, insurance, and fifty percent of all repairs over $200.
The trial court also allowed the wife to sell the residence at any time
and receive fifty percent of the net proceeds from the sale.36 "[A]limony
may be awarded either from the [H]usband's earnings or from the corpus
of his estate, as by granting to the [W]ife the title or use of property in
the possession of the [H]usband. ''37 Therefore, the supreme court

27. Farrish,279 Ga. at 551, 615 S.E.2d at 510.
28. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5 (2004).
29. Id. § 19-6-5(7).
30. Farrish,279 Ga. at 551, 615 S.E.2d at 511.
31. Id. at 551-52, 615 S.E.2d at 511; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5(4).
32. Farrish,279 Ga. at 552, 615 S.E.2d at 511.
33. Id. at 551-52,615 S.E.2d at 511; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-1(c) (2004); Hand v. Hand,
244 Ga. 41, 41-42, 257 S.E.2d 507, 507 (1979).
34. Farrish,279 Ga. at 552, 615 S.E.2d at 511.
35. 280 Ga. 92, 623 S.E.2d 480 (2005).
36. Id. at 92, 623 S.E.2d at 481.
37. Hipps v. Hipps, 278 Ga. 49, 50, 597 S.E.2d 359, 361 (2004) (quoting Jones v. Jones,
220 Ga. 753, 755, 141 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1965)); see also O.C.G.A. § 19-6-5.
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confirmed that the trial court did not err in making the alimony
award. 38
Similarly, in Searcy v. Searcy,39 the supreme court affirmed the wife's
right to seek an alimony award from the husband's interest in his
deceased parents' unprobated estates.' ° The supreme court, however,
held that the wife was not entitled to join the co-executors of the estates
as parties."
The property controlled by the co-executors was not
marital property, 2 and there was no evidence that either the husband
or the executors had acted in a manner to defraud the wife.' 3
In Findley v. Findley," the supreme court considered the issue of
when a spouse's alimony obligation terminates." Absent an expressed
intent otherwise, alimony automatically terminates upon the death of
the payor." When the parties divorced in 1975, the husband agreed to
pay $500 per month in alimony to the wife until she died or remarried,
whichever occurred first. The agreement did not expressly state the
parties' intent should the husband predecease the wife. The husband
died in 2004, and his estate refused to continue making the alimony
payments. The wife sued the husband's estate, and the trial court
dismissed the action.' 7
At the time of the parties' divorce, the prevailing case law was Ramsay
v. Sims. 8 In Ramsay the Georgia Supreme Court held that language
similar to that contained in the Findley's agreement was sufficient to
express an intent that alimony was to continue beyond the husband's
death. 4'9 The alimony terminated only upon those conditions specifically set forth in the agreement." In Dolvin v. Dolvin,5" a 1981 case, the
supreme court overruled Ramsay, holding that agreements stating that

38. Smelser, 280 Ga. at 92, 623 S.E.2d at 481.
39. 280 Ga. 311, 627 S.E.2d 572 (2006).
40. Id. at 313, 627 S.E.2d at 574.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 312, 627 S.E.2d at 574; cf. Gardner v. Gardner, 276 Ga. 189, 191, 576 S.E.2d
857, 859 (2003).
43. Searcy, 280 Ga. at 313; 627 S.E.2d at 574; cf. Brown v. Brown, 271 Ga. 887, 888,
525 S.E.2d 359, 360 (2000); Roberts v. Roberts, 226 Ga. 203, 209, 173 S.E.2d 675, 679-80
(1970).
44. 280 Ga. 454, 629 S.E.2d 222 (2006).
45. Id. at 454, 629 S.E.2d at 223-24.
46. See Schartle v. Trust Co. Bank, 239 Ga. 248, 249, 236 S.E.2d 602, 603 (1977).
47. Findley, 280 Ga. at 454-55, 629 S.E.2d at 224.
48. 209 Ga. 228, 71 S.E.2d 639 (1952).
49. Id. at 237-38, 71 S.E.2d at 644-45.
50. Id.
51. 248 Ga. 439, 284 S.E.2d 254 (1981).
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were
alimony terminated on the death or remarriage of the recipient
52
insufficient to create an obligation on the payor's estate.
Case law is typically applied retroactively.5 3 However, Georgia
appellate courts will not apply a decision retroactively (1) where the
decision is intended only to be applied prospectively, (2) where the
retroactive application would cause substantial inequities, or (3) where
the retroactive application would unjustly impact parties that justifiably
relied on the prior case law.54 In applying the test to the facts of this
case, the supreme court first noted that the decision in Dolvin did not
expressly address prospective application; however, the court applied its
own decision retroactively.55 Additionally, while the wife would be
injured by the retroactive application, the injury would not be the type
56
of "'substantial inequitable results"' contemplated by the test.
Furthermore, the potential class that would be adversely impacted by
retroactive application would be small.5" As a result, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the wife's action."
Some courts have eliminated the need to have alimony extend beyond
the death of the payor by requiring life insurance as part of the alimony
agreement.59 In McReynolds v. PrudentialInsurance Co.,6 the parties
included a provision in their agreement requiring the husband to
maintain the wife as a beneficiary to $250,000 in life insurance. Before
the husband died, he changed the beneficiary designation to his new
wife. The first wife sued the second wife and the insurance company to
recoup the insurance proceeds and other damages.6 ' The insurance
company was granted summary judgment, and the wife appealed.62
The supreme court determined that the insurance company's contract
was with the husband; as a result, the company owed no duty to
investigate claims questioned by the wife. 6 3 Additionally, the prior
communications between the wife and the insurance company did not

52.

Id. at 440-41, 284 S.E.2d at 255 (affirming Schartle, 239 Ga. 248, 236 S.E.2d 602

(1977)).
53.
54.
55.
56.

See Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 266 Ga. 607, 609, 469 S.E.2d 171, 174 (1996).
Findley, 280 Ga. at 459-60, 629 S.E.2d at 227.
Id. at 461-62, 629 S.E.2d at 228-29.
Id. at 462, 629 S.E.2d at 229.

57.

Id.

58.

Id.

59. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Hawkins, 268 Ga. 637, 638, 491 S.E.2d 806, 807 (1997).
60.

276 Ga. App. 747, 624 S.E.2d 218 (2005).

61. Id. at 749, 624 S.E.2d at 220. The second wife was sued as both the beneficiary of
the insurance policy and as the executrix of the husband's estate. Id.
62.

Id. at 747, 624 S.E.2d at 219.

63. Id. at 751-52, 624 S.E.2d at 222.

2006]

DOMESTIC RELATIONS

create any enforceable promises. 64 The supreme court noted, however,
that the first wife's remaining claims against the second wife could have
65
merit under Georgia law.
III.

CHILD CUSTODY

The Georgia Supreme Court addressed two cases concerning the trial
court's exercise of discretion in child custody cases. In Bull v. Bull,"
the supreme court affirmed the trial court's award of primary physical
custody to the mother." Although the mother had a history of problems with substance abuse and depression, the trial court determined
that the mother had sought treatment and appeared to have her life in
order at the time of the trial.68 Where, as here, there is evidence in
support of the trial court's finding that the parent was fit to have
custody, the appellate courts will not disturb the decision.69
In Taylor v. Taylor,"° the supreme court reversed the trial court's
decision, concluding that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion.7
The parties had reached an agreement wherein the father
agreed to relinquish his parental rights and the mother agreed to
relinquish her claim to child support from the father. When the father
reneged on the agreement, the mother filed a motion to enforce the
agreement. The trial court expressed its displeasure with the agreement
and stated that the agreement was not in the child's best interests.
Nonetheless, the trial court believed it was compelled to approve the
parties' negotiated agreement.72 The supreme court held that contrary
to the trial court's belief, the trial court had the authority to either
approve or reject the agreement in part or in its entirety.7 3 Furthermore, the supreme court held that where the trial court believes an

64. Id. at 750-51, 624 S.E.2d at 222.
65. Id. at 752 n.6, 624 S.E.2d at 222-23 n.6 (citing Curtis v. Curtis, 243 Ga. 611, 255
S.E.2d 693 (1979) (action for breach of implied trust against newly named beneficiary);
Brooks v. Jones, 227 Ga. 566, 188 S.E.2d 861 (1971) (action against decedent's estate for
breach of divorce decree)).
66. 280 Ga. 49, 622 S.E.2d 326 (2005).
67. Id. at 50, 622 S.E.2d at 327.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Urquhart v. Urquhart, 272 Ga. 548, 549, 533 S.E.2d 80, 81-82 (2000).
70. 280 Ga. 88, 623 S.E.2d 477 (2005).
71. Id. at 89, 623 S.E.2d at 478.
72. Id. at 88, 623 S.E.2d at 478.
73. Id. at 89-90, 623 S.E.2d at 478-79; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-9-5(b) (2004); Pekor v.
Clark, 236 Ga. 457, 458-59, 224 S.E.2d 30, 30-31 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 213 Ga. 545,
552, 100 S.E.2d 289, 295 (1957); Amos v. Amos, 212 Ga. 670, 671-72, 95 S.E.2d 5, 6 (1956).
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agreement contravenes the child's best interests, approving the
agreement is error. v4
In Braynon v. Hilbert,7 the court of appeals addressed the appropriate legal standard to be applied in a custody case.76 The parties in this
case entered into a mediated settlement agreement allowing the father
to legitimize the parties' child. While the agreement also addressed the
father's child support obligation, it did not address custody. The father
filed a subsequent action seeking custody.77 The trial court denied the
father's action because the father could not show any material change
of circumstances affecting the welfare of the child. Because the issue of
custody was not addressed in the legitimation action, the father argued
that he only had to show that awarding him custody was in the child's
best interests. 78 The court of appeals agreed, reasoning as follows:
In a case, where the father seeks custody after legitimation, the trial
court should apply the best interest of the child standard set forth in
O.C.G.A. [section] 19-9-3(a). As there has been no previous adjudication of the custody issue in such a case, the change in conditions
analysis should not be used.79
IV.

CHILD CUSTODY: NON-PARENTS

During the survey period, cases between parents and grandparents
continued to reach the appellate courts. Georgia law grants grandparents standing to intervene in divorce cases in order to seek visitation
rights.8 ' The trial court is authorized to grant visitation to the
grandparents where it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the
children's health or welfare would be harmed by the denial of visitation
and where the visitation would be in the children's best interests.8 ' In
Ormond v. Ormond,"' the parents of two children were divorcing, and
the maternal grandparents, who reside in Texas, filed a motion to
intervene. The parents reached a settlement agreement naming the
father as the primary physical custodian and giving the mother

74.
75.
76.
77.
change

Taylor, 280 Ga. at 90, 623 S.E.2d at 479.
275 Ga. App. 511, 621 S.E.2d 529 (2005).
Id. at 511-12, 621 S.E.2d at 529.
Id. at 512, 621 S.E.2d at 530. The father's pleading was actually titled "petition for
of custody." Id.

78.

Id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3 (2004).

79.

Braynon, 275 Ga. App. at 512,621 S.E.2d at 530 (citing Kennedy v. Adams, 218 Ga.

App. 120, 122, 460 S.E.2d 540, 543 (1995)).
80.
81.
82.

O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3 (2004).
Clark v. Wade, 273 Ga. 587, 599, 544 S.E.2d 99, 108 (2001).
274 Ga. App. 869, 619 S.E.2d 370 (2005).
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visitation rights. The trial court approved the parties' agreement and
then considered the grandparents' motion. The trial court awarded
visitation to the grandparents during one of the mother's allotted
weekends for visitation. While the trial court made written findings that
the grandparents' visitation was in the best interests of the children, the
court did not make a finding that the children would be harmed by a
denial of visitation with the grandparents.8 3 According to the court of
appeals, the failure to make all of the required findings demanded a
reversal.8 4
V.

CHILD CUSTODY: MODIFICATION

Relocation and jurisdiction continue to be the issues dominating the
child custody modification cases coming before the appellate courts. In
2003 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a custodial parent's
relocation could be considered a material change in circumstances that
would warrant a modification of custody if the modification was also in
the child's best interest.8 5
In Hardin v. Hardin,ss the court of appeals affirmed a judgment
modifying custody to the party remaining in Georgia. 7 When the
mother announced she was moving to Minnesota to seek employment,
the father filed a modification action. When the trial court entered a
temporary order modifying custody in the event of either party's
relocation, the mother remained in Georgia, and custody was not
modified in the final order.8 8 Subsequently, the mother announced that
she was taking a job in Nashville, Tennessee, and she relocated with the
children without giving the requisite notice to the father. After the
father filed a second modification action, the trial court awarded the
father primary physical custody. The mother then returned to Georgia
and filed a motion for new trial. The trial court revised the mother's
visitation schedule in light of her return to Georgia but did not revisit
the custody issue. 9

83. Id. at 869-70, 619 S.E.2d at 371-72.
84. Id. at 871, 619 S.E.2d at 372.
85. Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 446-47, 588 S.E.2d 728, 729 (2003) (overruling
Ormandy v. Odom, 217 Ga. App. 780, 459 S.E.2d 439 (1995)).
86. 274 Ga. App. 543, 618 S.E.2d 169 (2005).
87. Id. at 545, 618 S.E.2d at 171.
88. Id. at 543, 618 S.E.2d at 170. The temporary order was entered prior to the

supreme court decision in Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 578 S.E.2d 876 (2003), which
prohibited courts from utilizing self-effectuating change of custody provisions. Hardin, 274

Ga. App. at 543 n.1, 618 S.E.2d at 170 n.1.
89. Hardin, 274 Ga. App. at 543-44, 618 S.E.2d at 170.
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The mother argued that the relocation benefited the children because
the mother had been unable to find employment in Georgia and the
increased income associated with the out-of-state employment would
directly benefit the children. Despite the mother's arguments, the trial
court also heard evidence that the move interfered with the children's
relationship with their father and other family members. Other
evidence showed that while the children were living in Nashville, they
had problems in school, including excessive tardiness.9" Due to the
conflicting evidence on whether the move was in the children's best
interests, the court of appeals could not hold that the trial court abused
its discretion. 9' Furthermore, the court of appeals held that the
mother's return to Georgia did not require the custody modification to
be vacated.9 2 The trial court had evidence before it-the mother's
willingness to interfere with the children's familial relationships, her
inability to get the children to school on time, and her willingness to
violate a court order-that supported the decision not to restore the
original custody decision.93
Similarly, in Curtis v. Klimowicz,94 the court of appeals held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion. 9 Despite a joint physical
custody arrangement in the divorce decree, the child resided primarily
with the father, who was enlisted in the U.S. Army and had moved to
Kansas. When the father was deployed to Iraq for approximately four
months, the child stayed with the father's current wife. After the father
returned, the mother filed her modification action, and the father filed
a counterclaim for primary physical custody.96 The trial court, having
been presented with evidence of the mother's drug use and poor care of
the child, awarded the father primary physical custody; however, it
prohibited the father from moving outside of the United States with the
child.97 The court of appeals held that the trial court acted within its
discretion.9" While the trial court prohibited the father from moving
the child outside of the country, the trial court did not attempt to divest
the father of custody if the father moved; hence, the order was not an

90. Id. at 544, 618 S.E.2d at 170-71.
91. Id. at 544-45, 618 S.E.2d at 171.
92. Id. at 545, 618 S.E.2d at 171.
93. Id.
94. 279 Ga. App. 425, 631 S.E.2d 464 (2006).
95. Id. at 425, 631 S.E.2d at 465.
96. Id., 631 S.E.2d at 465-66. The appellate court did not address the requirement in
O.C.G.A. section 19-9-23 (2004) that custody modification actions must be filed as separate
actions and not filed as counter-complaints.
97. Curtis, 279 Ga. App. at 425-26, 631 S.E.2d at 465-66.
98. Id. at 428, 631 S.E.2d at 467.
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illegal self-effectuating change of custody.99 While trial courts may not
attempt to secure continuing jurisdiction over finalized custody cases by
prohibiting the child from being removed from the state court's
jurisdiction,0 0 the prohibition of a child's removal from the country
does not attempt to maintain jurisdiction over the parties and child. 0 1
The appellate court further noted that the trial court considered the
negative effects that relocating outside the United States would have on
the child and the child's relationship with her mother.102
The Georgia Supreme Court addressed the issue of jurisdiction in
modification cases. When Georgia adopted its version of the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"),' 0 ' the
Act included a provision that allowed Georgia to retain exclusive
jurisdiction over custody cases where either parent or the child has
remained a resident of Georgia.'0 4 In Devito v. Devito,' the mother
moved after the divorce from Georgia to Louisiana with the parties'
child. The father, who remained a resident of Georgia, filed a modification action in Georgia and served the mother in Louisiana. The mother
challenged the constitutionality of the continuing exclusive jurisdiction
provision.'0 6 According to the court, the Georgia Constitution requires
that civil cases not addressed by other constitutional provisions "'shall
be tried in the county where the defendant resides."" 7 The supreme
court held that this provision does not apply to cases where the
Thus, the trial court properly exercised
defendant is a non-resident.'
jurisdiction over the non-resident mother. 0 9
VI.

CHILD SUPPORT: GUIDELINES

Although the Legislature passed sweeping changes to Georgia's Child
Support Guidelines 1 in 2005, additional changes were made in 2006,
and the effective date of the new guidelines was pushed back to January

99.
(2003).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 426-27, 631 S.E.2d at 466-67; see Scott v. Scott, 276 Ga. 372, 578 S.E.2d 876
See Anthony v. Anthony, 212 Ga. 356, 357-58, 92 S.E.2d 857, 858 (1956).
See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 252 Ga. 46, 48-49, 311 S.E.2d 456, 458-59 (1984).
Curtis,279 Ga. App. at 427, 631 S.E.2d at 467.
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -102 (2004 & Supp. 2006).
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-61.

105.

280 Ga. 367, 628 S.E.2d 108 (2006).

106.
107.

Id. at 367, 628 S.E.2d at 109.
Id. at 368, 628 S.E.2d at 109 (quoting-GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. 6).

108. Id.
109.
110.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15 (Supp. 2006).
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Instead of calculating child support based on the non-

custodial parent's income, the new "income shares" model is designed to
have the child support divided between the parties on a pro rata
basis.12

To calculate child support under the new guidelines, O.C.G.A. section
19-6-15(b) enumerates seven basic steps:113 (1) determine the Adjusted
Gross Income ("AGI") of each party;114 (2) add the parties' respective
AGIs to get the parties' Combined Adjusted Income ("CAI");" 5 (3)
calculate each party's "income share" by dividing that party's AGI by the
CAI;... (4) using the statutory tables, determine the Basic Child
Support Obligation ("BCSO") by finding the amount listed for the
parties' Combined Adjusted Gross Income ("CAGI") based on the correct
number of children involved;" 7 (5) determine the existence of any
healthcare insurance or work-related childcare expenses and how the
expenses are actually to be paid;"' (6) determine the presumptive
child support amount by adjusting the BCSO upward for that party's
underpayment of any health insurance or work-related childcare
expenses or downward for that party's overpayment of any such
expenses;" 9 and (7) determine if any discretionary 120deviations are
warranted, while considering the child's best interests.
The 2006 changes restored the right to have a jury decide child
support. 12' However, the jury must first determine the parties' AGI
before being charged with the remainder of the guidelines' calculation. 1 22 The child support amount is no longer automatically adjusted
based on the amount of visitation, but the amount of visitation still may

111. Id. The 2005 Act required a commission to review the financial needs of families
and to create a table to be used in the guidelines. The effective date originally was to be
January 1, 2006; however, the commission took longer than expected, and the legislature
decided to make significant changes to the 2005 Act. As a result, the effective date was
postponed until January 1, 2007. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id. § 19-6-15(b).
114. According to O.C.G.A. section 19-6-15(b)(2), a party's gross income maybe adjusted
for fifty percent of self-employment taxes; the amount paid under pre-existing child support
orders; and, with court approval, theoretical child support orders. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(2).
115. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(3).
116. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(5).
117. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(4).
118. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(6).
119. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(7).
120. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(8).
121. Id. § 19-6-15(c)(4).
122. Id.
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be a basis for a discretionary departure.'2 3 The 1new
guidelines apply
24
to both temporary and final child support orders.
VII.

CHILD SUPPORT

The Georgia Supreme Court decided three cases concerning the
application of the child support guidelines. In Dial v. Dial,2 5 the
supreme court held that the trial court erred in ordering the husband to
pay child support for a child for which the wife had assumed a temporary legal guardianship.'2 6 In Blue v. Blue,'27 the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's departure from the guidelines. 28 The trial
court cited the parties' comparable earning capacities and a joint
physical custody arrangement as bases for not ordering either party to
pay child support to the other. 29 Because the hearing was not transcribed, the appellate court had to presume that the evidence supported
the trial court's findings;' therefore, it could not hold that there was
an abuse of discretion.' 3 '
In Bullard v. Swafford, 3 2 the parties' decree included a provision
that extended child support beyond the child's eighteenth birthday in the
event the child had not graduated from high school but remained a fulltime student. Due to excessive absences and tardiness, the parties' child
did not graduate by his eighteenth birthday in May 2004. The child did
not attend summer school as planned, but he did register for classes for
the following fall. The trial court agreed with the father, holding that
the child support terminated when the child ceased to be a full-time
student at the end of the 2003-2004 school year. 3 ' The supreme court,
reversing the trial court's decision, held that the child's voluntary
absences and tardiness did not change the child's full-time enrollment
Similarly, the court concluded that there was no
to something less.3

123. Id. § 19-6-15(b)(8)(K).
124. Id. § 19-6-15(c)(1).
125. 279 Ga. 767, 621 S.E.2d 461 (2005).
126. Id. at 767, 621 S.E.2d at 462.
127. 279 Ga. 550, 615 S.E.2d 540 (2005).
128. Id. at 550, 615 S.E.2d at 540.
129. Id.
130. Id., 615 S.E.2d at 541 (citing Leitzke v. Leitzke, 239 Ga. 17, 18, 235 S.E.2d 500,
501 (1977)).
131. Id.
132. 279 Ga. 577, 619 S.E.2d 665 (2005).
133. Id. at 577-79, 619 S.E.2d at 666.
134. Id. at 580, 619 S.E.2d at 667.
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requirement that the child attend summer sessions to remain a full-time
student. 135
VIII.

EQUITABLE DIVISION

The Georgia Supreme Court addressed a variety of cases concerning
equitable division. In Rabek v. Kellum,' the husband worked as an
air traffic controller for the Federal Aviation Commission. Through his
employment, he participated in a Civil Service Retirement System
pension plan instead of social security. The wife, however, was employed
in the private sector. She had a pension, but she also participated in
social security. The trial court divided the two pensions. The husband
appealed, claiming the trial court should not have equitably divided the
portion of his pension plan, which was in lieu of social security
3 7 The supreme court recognized that this was a case of
payments."
first impression and that foreign jurisdictions were divided on the
issue.13 s However, the court chose not to decide the issue because the
husband had failed to provide the trial court with any evidence on the
amount of the pension that was in lieu of social security.139
In Hayes v. Hayes,4 ' the supreme court reviewed the trial court's
determination that certain contributions to the equity in the marital
home were the husband's separate property.14 During the parties'
marriage, each of the husband's parents gave each party a check for
$10,000 to be used for improvements to the marital residence. After
hearing the husband's father testify that the intent was to gift the
husband the entire $40,000, but that half of the checks were made
payable to the wife to avoid certain income tax consequences, the trial
court found that the $40,000 was the husband's non-marital contribution.' 42 The supreme court held that because the husband and his
parents engaged in a "sham transaction" to defraud the Internal
Revenue Service, the divorce court would not relieve them of their

135. Id. at 581, 619 S.E.2d at 667.
136.
137.

279 Ga. 709, 620 S.E.2d 387 (2005).
Id. at 709-10, 620 S.E.2d at 387-88.

138. Id. at 710 n.2,620 S.E.2d at 388 n.2. The court noted that Ohio and Pennsylvania
have excluded portions of pensions from the marital estate. Id. (citing Walker v. Walker,
677 N.E.2d 1252, 1253-54 (Ohio 1996); Cornbleth v. Cornbleth, 580 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990)). Utah and West Virginia have not. Id. (citing Jefferies v. Jefferies, 895
P.2d 835, 837-38 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Loudermilk v. Loudermilk, 397 S.E.2d 905, 909-10
(W. Va. 1990)).
139. Id. at 711, 620 S.E.2d at 388.
140. 279 Ga. 741, 620 S.E.2d 806 (2005).
141. Id. at 741-42, 620 S.E.2d at 807.
142. Id. at 741-42, 742 n.4, 620 S.E.2d at 807 & n.4; see also I.R.C. § 2503 (2000).
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agreement.'
Because the parents made gifts to each spouse, the trial
court erred in finding that the entire $40,000 was the husband's
separate property.'"
The supreme court addressed several challenges to the fairness of the
trial court's equitable division of marital assets. In Harmon v. Harmon,14 1 the supreme court held that "an award is not erroneous simply
because one party receives a seemingly greater share of the marital
property. An equitable division of marital property does not necessarily
mean an equal division." 46 In Fuller v. Fuller,' the award to the
husband of seventy-five percent of his retirement was not determined to
be inequitable. 4 '
Similarly, in Waters v. Waters,'49 the award of
seventy-five percent of the cash value of an insurance policy to the wife
was upheld. 5 °
IX.

FAMILY VIOLENCE

Both appellate courts heard cases involving the Family Violence Act
("FVA"). 51 In Anderson v. Deas,'5 ' the court of appeals affirmed the
dismissal of a family violence case based on lack of jurisdiction. 153 The
mother and child resided in Georgia, but the father was a resident of
Maryland, where custody litigation remained pending. During a
telephone conversation between the father and the child, the father
allegedly made threats to physically harm the child. When the mother
15 4
got on the line, the father allegedly threatened the mother's life.

143. Hayes, 279 Ga. at 741-42 n.4, 620 S.E.2d at 807 n.4 (citing Whitley v. Whitley, 220
Ga. 471, 473-74, 139 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1964)).
144. Id. at 742, 620 S.E.2d at 807-08.
145. 280 Ga. 118, 622 S.E.2d 336 (2005).
146. Id. at 118, 622 S.E.2d at 336 (citing Wright v. Wright, 277 Ga. 133, 134, 587
S.E.2d 600, 601 (2003); Goldstein v. Goldstein, 262 Ga. 136, 136, 414 S.E.2d 474, 475
(1992); Mitchely v. Mitchely, 237 Ga. 138, 139, 227 S.E.2d 34, 35 (1976)).
147. 279 Ga. 805, 621 S.E.2d 419 (2005).
148. Id. at 808, 621 S.E.2d at 422.
149. 280 Ga. 477, 629 S.E.2d 233 (2006).
150. Id. at 478, 629 S.E.2d at 235.
151. O.C.G.A. §§ 19-13-1 to -56 (2004).
152. 273 Ga. App. 770, 615 S.E.2d 859 (2005). The Georgia Supreme Court granted the
mother's writ of certiorari and remanded the case to the court of appeals for further
consideration. Anderson v. Deas, No. S05C1751, 2005 Ga. LEXIS 773, at *1 (Ga. Nov. 7,
2005). On remand, the court of appeals adhered to its original decision, again affirming
the trial court's dismissal of the action. Anderson v. Deas, 279 Ga. App. 892, 892, 632
S.E.2d 682, 683 (2006).
153. Anderson, 273 Ga. App. at 770, 615 S.E.2d at 860.
154. Id.
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The mother sought a restraining order, and the father filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.1 15 The mother argued that the trial
court was authorized to exercise jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, 56 the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA"),' 5 ' or the FVA. 58
Both the UCCJEA and PKPA allow courts to assume emergency
jurisdiction where the child is present in Georgia and the child is either
abandoned or in need of protection from abuse. 159 Because the child
was in the mother's custody, the court of appeals held that the trial
court was within its discretion to find there was no emergency requiring
it to assume jurisdiction.16 °
Under the FVA, a court must have personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.' 6 ' Personal jurisdiction exists where (a) the defendant
commits the act of family violence in Georgia, or (b) where the defendant
commits a tortious injury in Georgia and the defendant has certain
contacts with the state. 162 The court of appeals held that the father's
alleged threats were committed in Maryland.' 63 Because the injury
occurred in Georgia, personal jurisdiction over the non-resident father
could not be exercised unless the father also had the requisite contacts
with Georgia, which he did not."

X.

ATTORNEY FEES

The Georgia Supreme Court decided several cases regarding attorney
fee awards. In Groover v. Groover,'65 the supreme court held that a
court errs when it admits evidence relating to attorney fee expenses in
a jury trial.' 66 An award of attorney fees is in the discretion of the
court
trial judge, not the jury. 67 In this case, however, the supreme
6
held that the error did not warrant the grant of a new trial. 1

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
230 Ga.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id., 615 S.E.2d at 859.
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-9-40 to -102.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
O.C.G.A. §§ 19-13-1 to -56.
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-64(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
Anderson, 273 Ga. App. at 771 n.5, 615 S.E.2d at 860 n.5 (citing Rozier v. Berto,
App. 427, 429, 496 S.E.2d 544, 545-46 (1998)).
See O.C.G.A. § 19-13-2 (Supp. 2006).
Id.
Anderson, 273 Ga. App. at 773, 615 S.E.2d at 862.
Id.
279 Ga. 507, 614 S.E.2d 50 (2005).
Id. at 508, 614 S.E.2d at 52.
See O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2004).
Groover, 279 Ga. at 508, 614 S.E.2d at 52.
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In Williams v. Cooper,169 the supreme court reversed the fee award
against the husband's attorney. 7 ° In the wife's contempt petition, she
sought relief including an award of attorney fees. After a hearing, the
trial court required the husband to pay the wife $500 under O.C.G.A.
section 19-6-2. The trial court then ordered the husband's attorney to
pay $5,278.53 in fees under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14(b)."7' However,
the wife had not filed any motions seeking attorney fees under O.C.G.A.
section 9-15-14 from the husband or his attorney.'7 2 The form scheduling the hearing did not provide any notice that attorney fees might be
awarded under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 or that the attorney might be
held liable.'73 Due to the differing statutory rationales 74 for attorney fee awards, the supreme court held that notice and conduction of a
hearing under O.C.G.A. section 19-6-2 cannot sustain an award under
O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14(b). 7 5 Furthermore, the individual being
assessed fees under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 must have received notice
of the proper hearing.'
The supreme court overruled Cohen v.
Feldman 77 to the extent that the court of appeals in Cohen had
interpreted O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 to 1allow
trial courts to award fees
7
sua sponte without notice or a hearing.
Similarly, in Fox-Korucu v. Korucu,'7 9 the supreme court held that
the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees under O.C.G.A. section 915-14.180 The wife had filed a motion for a new trial and a motion for
reconsideration after the entry of the divorce decree. After considering
the wife's new evidence, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial
but partially granted the motion for reconsideration by altering the
visitation schedule. The trial court then granted the husband a fee
award under O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 without an evidentiary hearing.18 While the failure to hold an evidentiary hearing was alone a

169. 280 Ga. 145, 625 S.E.2d 754 (2006).
170. Id. at 147, 625 S.E.2d at 756.
171. Id. at 145, 625 S.E.2d at 755; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2006).
172. Williams, 280 Ga. at 146, 625 S.E.2d at 755; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14.
173. Williams, 280 Ga. at 146, 625 S.E.2d at 755.
174. The court noted that the purpose of a fee award under O.C.G.A. section 19-6-2 is
to allow each party to have effective representation; the purpose of an award under
O.C.G.A. section 9-15-14 is to compensate a party who incurred needless attorney fees due
to the other party's misconduct. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 147, 625 S.E.2d at 755-56.
177. 219 Ga. App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237 (1995).
178. Williams, 280 Ga at 147, 625 S.E.2d at 756.
179. 279 Ga. 769, 621 S.E.2d 460 (2005).
180. Id. at 770, 621 S.E.2d at 461.
181. Id. at 769, 621 S.E.2d at 460-61.
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reversible error, 8 2 the supreme court held that the trial court also
abused its discretion in assessing fees against the wife under O.C.G.A.
section 9-15-14
when the trial court granted some of the requested relief
183
to the wife.

The right to an evidentiary hearing on attorney fees, however, may be
waived. In Bulat v. Bulat,8 4 the parties agreed to a less formal
procedure, submitting the attorney fees issue to the trial court for
decision. 85 The supreme court held that the parties were bound by
their agreement. 8
XI.

CONCLUSION

This survey period saw the area of domestic relations law continue to
change and evolve. Based on bills passed by the legislature and
approved by the governor, the state will have new child support
guidelines and direct appeals for child support issues. The Georgia
Supreme Court, which has continued to voluntarily grant all nonfrivolous appellate applications, has also continued to issue opinions on
important domestic relations issues. Members of the domestic relations
bar persist in hoping that the Georgia Supreme Court will continue its
pilot project and that the Georgia Court of Appeals will institute a
similar project.

182. Id. at 770 n.2, 621 S.E.2d at 461 n.2 (citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863,
548 S.E.2d 303, 304 (2001)).
183. Id. at 770, 621 S.E.2d at 461.
184. 280 Ga. 310, 626 S.E.2d 504 (2006).
185. Id. at 310, 626 S.E.2d at 505.
186. Id.

